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by will can be justified on this basis. In many instances the intentions of
a testator can be frustrated. For example, the wishes of a testator as
expressed by will are not followed when the rule against perpetuities is
violated, when the testator has imposed unreasonable restraints upon the
alienation of property, when a widow pursues her dower rights or
statutory forced share against the will, when beneficiaries completely re-
nounce their rights under a will and when a beneficiary receiving property
under a will immediately distributes it in a manner which he considers
more equitable than that stated in a will. Nevertheless, whether the rights
acquired by virtue of a compromise agreement are regarded as entitling
one to receive this property or interest as if one were a devisee or legatee,
or whether a compromise agreement is regarded as not altering the fact
that the property passes to the devisees and legatees at the moment of
the testator's death with any rights acquired by virtue of this agreement
as being contractual and not testamentary, the result is the same-the
limitation or destruction of the right to dispose of property by will.
VACATING PLAT DEDICATIONS IN INDIANA
The modern subdivision developer's practice of dedicating more
land to public uses to satisfy the new-home buyer's demand for particular
land use has created a peculiar titles problem in Indiana. Since Indiana
holds that a dedication of land to a particular public use creates only an
easement for the intended use in the public with the fee reserved in the
dedicator,' the title to dedicated land is not held by the governmental
authority charged with the responsibility of utilizing the land for the
particular purpose. Often, acquisition of the fee by the governmental
unit is, for practical purposes, a necessity to effectuate the intended use
of the land. For example, if land is dedicated for a purpose that requires
expensive improvements in order to comply with the dedication, e.g., a
school building on land dedicated for school purposes, it is impossible
to obtain sufficient funds to erect the building because the easement does
not provide sufficient security for the lender's money.2 The anomaly is
1. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N.E. 942 (1896); Decker v.
Evansville Suburban & N. Ry., 133 Ind. 493, 33 N.E. 349 (1893) ; Brackney v. Boyd, 71
Ind. App. 592, 123 N.E. 695 (1919).
2. If the security for borrowed funds is only an easement for school purposes plus
the improvements thereon, the lender lacks a sufficient remedy against the borrower
on default. If he forecloses or reclaims the land and buildings, they will no longer be
used for school purposes since the school corporation is the only governmental unit
NOTES
that in situations like this the land cannot be used for the purpose of the
dedication until the dedication is vacated; i.e., the easement which the
dedication created must be extinguished and the fee to the land conveyed
to the governmental unit free from the restrictive easement in order to
effect the purpose of the dedication. This note is principally concerned
with the achievement of a vacation of dedicated land lying without the
corporate limits of a town by the statutory method for vacating dedicated
land.'
Three authorities are given statutory power to vacate in Indiana-
the board of public works,4 the county commissioners' and the circuit
court of the county in which the land is located.' The jurisdiction of
the circuit court and the county commissioners is concurrent with refer-
ence to highways.' Apparently the circuit court also has concurrent
jurisdiction with the board of public works with reference to streets,
in the area that operates a school. A non-complying use of the land results in a termina-
tion of the easement and a reversion of the land to the holder of the fee. So the lender,
although entitled to evict the school corporation on default, would be forced to allow
the school corporation to continue in possession in order to keep his security interest alive.
3. The note is necessarily confined to areas other than a first-class city or any
area within six miles of a first-class city since other provisions are made for these
areas. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-913 (Burns 1953).
4. INiD. ANN. STAT. § 48-2001 (Burns 1953) and IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-2001a
(Supp. 1961) grant power to a board of public works to vacate any street, alley or public
place within a city.
5. IND. ANN. STAT. § 65-118 (Bums 1953) vests in a board of county commissioners
the power to vacate any highway not within a city, but within the county.
6. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-903 (Bums 1953) provides,
Whenever any person or persons interested therein, or the owner or owners of
any lot . . . in any incorporated city or town, or which is not a corporation in
active operation, shall desire to vacate any street, alley or public ground therein
or any part thereof adjoining such lot . . . such person . . . shall file with
the circuit court in the county . . . his . . . petition, setting forth the particular
circumstances of the case, giving a distinct description of the property sought
to be vacated and the names of the persons particularly interested therein and
who shall be affected thereby, and notice of the filing and pendency of said
petition shall be given as in this act provided. If no objection within such time
be made in writing by any party interested, the court shall grant the prayer of
said petition. If objection thereto be made, the court shall set the same down for
trial and hearing by the court, and if, in its opinion, justice shall require it,
the court shall grant the prayer of said petition. . . . No vacation of any street,
alley or other public ground or part thereof shall take place over the objection
of any person or persons owning the property immediately adjoining the part
of such street or alley sought to be vacated until the damages, if any, of such
objecting parties, by such vacation, be first assessed by the court and paid to the
clerk thereof for their use and benefit by the petitioner or petitioners for such
vacation. Such damages shall be assessed against the petitioners ratably
according to the value of the property owned by each, as the same stands
taxed on the tax duplicates, and such judgment shall be conditional upon the
payment of the damages assessed within ninety days from the rendition of the
order and judgment of assessment.
7. Oler v. Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry., 184 Ind. 431, 111 N.E. 619 (1916) ; Hudson
Township v. Smith, 182 Ind. 260, 106 N.E. 359 (1914).
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alleys and public grounds located within the corporate limits of a town
or city as a result of an Indiana Appellate Court decision in which a peti-
tion was filed with the circuit court under section 48-903 to vacate a
public alley within the city limits.' The city challenged the jurisdiction of
the court contending that the statute only provided a procedure for vacat-
ing land not located within the corporate limits of a town or city, and
that the petitioner should have filed a petition with the board of public
works. The court held that section 48-903, i.e., a circuit court's power
to vacate, applied to land anywhere in the county and was not confined to
that land lying between the city limits and the county boundary. It is clear
from the foregoing that if a party desires vacation of a street, alley or
other public ground located within a city or town, he may file his petition
with either the board of public works or the circuit court of the county;
if he desires vacation of a highway that lies in the county, but without
the town or city limits, he may request such action by a board of county
commissioners. However, if he desires to vacate dedicated land which
lies without the town or city limits, and which was dedicated for a
purpose other than establishing a highway, the only proceeding open to
him is to petition the circuit court of the county as provided in section
48-903.
Vacating under section 48-903 requires consideration of two broad
problems. The first of these is how to initiate the action in accordance
with the statutory requirements; the second is what are the consequences
of a successful vacation; i.e., who is entitled to the possession and enjoy-
ment of the land once it is no longer dedicated land? Proper initiation
of an action requires a determination as to whether the tract sought to
be vacated comes with the purview of the statute; i.e., is it a ". . . street,
alley or public ground . . ." and, if it is, what interests are involved;
i.e., what names must appear on the face of the petition to satisfy the
provision for including " the names of the persons particularly
interested therein .... "9
ACTION TO VACATE: INITIATION AND CONSEQUENCES
What Land May Be Vacated. The decision in State v. Reeves"°
justifies the proposition that any tract of land dedicated through a
8. City of Richmond v. Miller, 58 Ind. App. 20, 107 N.E. 550 (1915).
9. The second problem, i.e., who is entitled to possession and enjoyment after
vacation, is so related to the first problem that it becomes almost impossible to discuss
them separately, especially in the determination of "particular interests." Hence it is
handled in various parts as the need arises while discussing the first problem (proper
initiation). However, an attempt is made to give the second problem a consolidated
treatment in the conclusion.
10. 237 Ind. 240, 144 N.E.2d 707 (1957).
NOTES
recorded plat is within the purview of the words, "... street, alley, or
public ground .... " and may be vacated under section 48-903. The
petitioners owned the lots which abutted a centrally located lake, beach
and park area dedicated in the plat and formally accepted by the county
commissioners. The non-abutting property owners in the subdivision
intervened, seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court
from proceeding in the action to vacate. The "non-abutters" contended
that the court was without jurisdiction because it could not vacate land
lying outside the corporate limits of a town or city, and that only a street
or alley, or something very similar to a street or alley, could be vacated
under section 48-903. The court rejected both of these contentions,
holding that the statute was not limited in application to the vacation of
streets and alleys, but also included public ground even if it was located
outside a municipality. By the nature of dedication, dedicated land is
intended to be public land or "public ground," so the court seems to have
held that any land which is dedicated by the recording of a plat may be
vacated under section 48-903.
The propriety of this holding is doubtful. The court disposed of the
contention regarding the inapplicability of the statute because of the lo-
cation of the ground by relying on a prior case1' which clearly had settled
the point, but then used the same case to dispose of the contention that
the statute was not intended to cover all dedicated land, stating:
This court has held that such act covers streets in a village which
has never been incorporated. . . It seems that it would then
follow that public grounds would, under like circumstances, also
come with the purview of the act.'
In other words, the court reasoned that if the statute is not limited in its
application because of the location of the dedicated land, likewise it should
not be limited as to the kind of dedicated land which may be vacated. A
sounder decision might have been reached by seeking the legislative intent
in the use of the words, "public ground," rather than relying on the
analogy-not limited in location, so not limited in kind-because the
statutory language could hardly afford an interpretation which limited
the applicability of the statute on the basis of the location of the land. 8
However, if section 48-903 is read together with its surrounding sections,
11. Hudson Township v. Smith, 182 Ind. 260, 106 N.E. 359 (1914).
12. State v. Reeves, 237 Ind. 240, 243, 144 N.E.2d 707, 709 (1957).
13. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-903 (Burns 1953) expressly states, "... or which is
not a corporation in active operation. .. ."
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it could easily be interpreted to apply only to land dedicated for certain
purposes.
Since the court in the Reeves case adopted the contentions of the
parties favoring vacation, it is interesting to examine their brief. The
brief relied principally on an Indiana case" which included quoted ma-
terial from a treatise 5 stating:
[T]he doctrine of dedication to public uses has also been ex-
tended and applied to public squares in cities and villages, these
being regarded as easements for the benefit of the public; and
the fact of dedication may be established in the same manner
as in the case of highways and streets. 6
The argument continues that since the park area was established, i.e.,
dedicated, in the same manner as the streets and alleys, it should be suscep-
tible to vacation in the same manner, and if vacation were not permitted
under section 48-903, there could be no vacation.
Simply because the dedication was made in a certain manner does not
mean that all land dedicated in this manner need be vacated in the same
way. The fact that land was dedicated by a statutory dedication, i.e., a
method provided by the legislature such as the marking and recording
of a plat, does not mean that the legislature was also required to provide
a method to vacate the dedication. To justify this conclusion it is necessary
to investigate briefly the law of dedication in general, and since Indiana
is an "easement" type state with reference to dedicated land, it is also
necessary to analyze the statute in the light of the law governing ex-
tinguishment of an easement.
Land may be dedicated in three ways-by common law dedication, 7
by a deed or conveyance' and by statute.19 Since the effect of a dedication
is to create an easement, it must be determined how an easement may be
extinguished. Prior to the enactment of the vacation statutes, an ease-
ment created by dedication could only be extinguished through the usual
14. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N.E. 942 (1896).
15. DILLION, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 644, 4th ed. (1890).
16. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 23, 43 N.E. 942, 943 (1896).
(Emphasis added.)
17. Town of Marion v. Skillman, 127 Ind. 130, 26 N.E. 676 (1890) ; Town of Posey-
ville v. Gatewood, 65 Ind. App. 50, 114 N.E. 483 (1917).
18. Smith v. State, 217 Ind. 643, 29 N.E.2d 786 (1940); Fassion v. Laundry,
123 Ind. 136, 24 N.E. 96 (1890).
19. Murray v. City of Huntingburg, 187 Ind. 504, 119 N.E. 209 (1918); Rhodes
v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N.E. 942 (1896); City of New Albany v.
Williams, 126 Ind. 1, 25 N.E. 187 (1890).
For a good discussion concerning how dedication is effected see Note, 7 U. FLA.
L. REv. 82 (1954).
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common law rules for exinguishing an easement.2" Actually, the vacation
statute gives an additional method to extinguish certain kinds of ease-
ments. The question is how much change in the common law did the
legislature intend to effect with the enactment of the statute. The Reeves
case said that the only limitation in the statute was that the dedicated land
sought to be vacated must have been dedicated by the marking and
recording of the plat. However, since the same court in another recent
case2 held that vacation is a strict statutory proceeding, it is apparent
that the court did not interpret the statute in a manner that would effect
a complete change in the common law. It is here contended that the
limitation on the use of the statute to extinguish the easement should be
based not only on the manner of dedication but also on the use for which
it is dedicated, i.e., that the vacation statutes should apply only to that
dedicated land to which all sections of the chapter are literally applicable."
Reading section 48-903 in conjunction with the two succeeding sec-
tions lends support to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend
that public ground should include all dedicated land lying in the plat.
Section 48-904" provides the grounds for remonstrating against a peti-
tion for vacation. Since the only valid grounds for remonstrance are the
statutory grounds,"4 failure to fit an objection into one of the three
grounds would apparently require the circuit court to grant the vacation."
20. Town of Freedom v. Norris, 128 Ind. 377, 27 N.E. 869 (1891); Perry v.
Carey, 68 Ind. App. 56, 119 N.E. 1010 (1918).
21. Wischmeyer v. Finch, 231 Ind. 385, 107 N.E.2d 661 (1952) ; jasper v. Taichert,
103 Ind. App. 302, 7 N.E. 534 (1937).
22. To lend support to the argument that vacation is available only in limited
situations, it is interesting to note that among "easement" type dedication states only
two, other than Indiana, provide for such proceeding to be initiated by a private individual.
See IowA CODE ANN. § 409.18-25 (1946) and OHIo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 3593-3603 (Page
1954).
23. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-904 (Bums 1953) provides:
When, in any proceeding for the vacation of any street, alley, or part thereof,
or other public ground, or of any block or blocks of lots, remonstrance is per-
mitted to be made, any person or persons feeling himself or themselves aggrieved
by the proposed vacation may remonstrate in Writing upon any one or more of
the following grounds and no other, to wit:
First. Because such addition, subdivision or part thereof, or street or alley
therein, or other public ground, so sought to be vacated is necessary to the
growth of the town or city in which the same is situated or which the same
adjoins.
Second. That the proposed vacation will leave the real estate of the remon-
strant or remonstrants, within any such town or city, without ingress or egress
by means of a public way or street.
Third. That such vacation will cut off the public's access to some church,
school or other public building or grounds.
24. Peru v. Cox, 173 Ind. 241, 90 N.E. 7 (1909) ; Richmond v. Miller, 58 Ind. App.
20, 107 N.E. 550 (1915).
25. There is an exception to the rule that vacation may be objected to only by
filing a remonstrance which is available because of section 48-904. If the land lies
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Since persons living in a subdivision certainly have an interest in the
continued use of dedicated land for its public purpose, if it is impossible
for them to raise a valid objection to a vacation proceeding, the statute
seems to create an absurd result. On examination of the statutory
grounds for remonstrance, it is discovered that it is impossible for the
individual lot owner to raise an objection to the vacation of certain kinds
of dedicated land. The second ground, containing the language, "ingress
and egress by means of a public street," and the third ground referring
to the "public's access to some church or school" would seem to provide
grounds for objecting only if that land for which vacation is sought
consists of a right of way, and the statutory language should control the
application of the two grounds. This leaves only the first ground-
"necessary to the growth of the town or city"-as a basis for objection.
The problem with an individual using this ground in objecting to a
vacation of "public ground" is that the failure of the town or city to
voice it should be good evidence that there is no necessity. In addition, in
situations where an individual's only possibility of objecting is by the
first ground, there is often serious doubt as to whether the vacation of
the dedicated land is the real reason that the land could not be used for
the dedicated purpose.26
Section 48-90527 provides that the land which is vacated shall be
added to the appropriate lot in the plat and identified by that lot number.
Since this provision is mandatory, it raises serious doubts as to whether
section 48-903 may be used to vacate a dedication of a tract which is so
large that adding it to abutting lots meets with objections. There is no
serious objection to the abutting property owner extending his owner-
ship over a vacated alley or street since the area is small and could be
utilized for few purposes. However, when a tract that is dedicated for a
within the corporate limits of a city, then the city may, because of its special interest in
dedicated land, file a denial, thereby forcing the petitioner to sustain his burden of proof.
Gaston v. City of Shelbyville, 234 Ind. 512, 129 N.E.2d 793 (1955).
26. Where land is dedicated to a use other than a right-of-way, such as for school
or park purposes, there is still no assurance that it will actually be used for that purpose
since the dedication creates no binding responsibility on the governmental authority
to actually utilize the land for that purpose, this responsibility occurring only when the
governmental unit formally accepts the dedication. The danger is that if vacation of such
land is allowed, the lot owner within the plat may be denied the use of the land for
which he has paid a valuable consideration in that the developer has charged enough
for the individual lots to cover the cost of the dedicated land. In a situation where the
governmental unit fails to formally accept the dedicated land, the lot owner could
raise no valid objection to the vacation, since the failure to accept negates the claim
that the dedication is necessary to the continued growth of the town.
27. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-905 (Burns 1953) provides, "When any platted property
shall have been vacated, the descriptions of the several lots and parcels thereof shall
be preserved as in the plat set forth, to which the proportionate part of any street or
alley, or part thereof, vacated shall be added according to law. .. 
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park or school purpose is vacated with the "abutters" taking the title to
such land in severalty,2" it is clear that the "abutters" reap a windfall at
the expense of the purchaser of a non-abutting lot within the plat.
The legislature did use the words "public ground," however, and the
words certainly are applicable to some dedicated land, especially in light
of the Reeves" case holding that "public ground" meant exactly what it
said. However, since the manner of dedication should not control, and
vacation is available only if the tract sought to be vacated comes within
the coverage of the statute, a conclusion must be reached clarifying the
limitation on the vacation of public ground. A better interpretation of
the statute would be that public ground dedicated through a plat may be
vacated only if the result of vacation is fee simple ownership of the land
by the abutting property owners. This construction would be consistent
with all the statutes, the laws of other states and the common law policy
of preserving dedicated land to the public use for which it was dedicated,
as long as the public may have need for it. If the tract is of such size
or importance that there are objections to the abutter's acquiring the fee,
th1en that public ground should not be susceptible to vacation. When the
dedicated tract is of this larger size, e.g., a park or a school yard, the
dedicator has good grounds for claiming a retention of the fee in the
nature of a possibility of reverter and a continued retention of this interest
whenever he sells the lots in the plat. If the dedicator's claim is valid, a
successful vacation would result in his owning the land without the re-
strictive easement. Therefore, this kind of public ground should not be
susceptible to vacation since section 48-903 could then be used to allow
the dedicator to recover the land after exploiting the dedication by selling
lots in reliance on it, whereas the statute is intended to allow better
utilization of the land by the owners within the plat."°
Parties to the Action: "Particular Interests." When it is decided
that the tract sought to be vacated comes within the purview of section
48-903, the petitioner must set forth, ". .. the names of the persons
particularly interested therein and who shall be affected thereby. . ."
This requires a determination, first, of what constitutes a particular
interest, and second, what persons hold a particular interest after the
simple act of dedication is complicated by conveying lots with reference
to the plat. The particular interest that the court recognizes is one that
28. It would be necessary for the several interests to be added to each lot since
unlike a street or alley, there are abutting lots on four sides of the dedicated tract.
This would make it impossible to extend each abutting lot's boundary line in a manner
that effects an equitable partition.
29. State v. Reeves, 237 Ind. 240, 144 N.E.2d 707 (1957).
30. Wischmeyer v. Finch, 231 Ind. 385, 107 N.E.2d 661 (1952).
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a vacation will damage and in which the damage is different in kind from
that suffered by the community in general, or aptly called a special or
peculiar injury. 1 In an early Indiana case3 2 concerning a street established
in a manner other than dedication by recording a plat, it was held that an
element in stating a cause of action for obstruction of a street was a show-
ing of a special or peculiar injury. This holding necessarily controlled the
showing required to collect money for damage33 caused by vacation, since
vacation also resulted in the obstruction of an existing right of way. A
case decided in 1916 eliminated the possibility that a person would obtain
a particular interest in dedicated land by purchasing a lot with reference
to the plat in which the dedication was made. The Indiana Supreme Court
refused, in a collateral attack against a vacation proceeding, to enjoin the
vacation of part of a street sought in order that a railroad might lower
its tracks, thereby partially obstructing the street. The petitioner con-
tended that he had a private right obtained by purchasing with reference
to a recorded plat which contained the dedication. The court held that the
petitioner had an adequate remedy at law. Since recovery at law required
his showing of a special or peculiar injury, the result tends to destroy the
private right generally thought to be acquired in dedicated property
through the purchase of a lot with reference to a plat.
Since a particular interest is one to which the vacation causes a special
or peculiar damage, it must be determined who holds the interest. As a
result of a case 5 in the Indiana Appellate Court, it is apparent that such
an interest is not limited to abutting property owners. In this case a peti-
tion to vacate a street was tested by demurrer with the principal objection
being that the petitioners had failed to bring themselves within the statute,
as they had failed to name the persons particularly interested. The peti-
tion stated that the petitioner owned all the property on both sides of the
portion to be vacated and that other streets afforded proper egress and
ingress to citizens of the town and the residents within the plat. The
court overruled the demurrer and said:
The statute under which this proceeding is maintained does not
expressly limit property owners who may object to the vacation
of a street to those owning property abutting on that part of the
31. Petition of Dearmin, 86 Ind. App. 349, 156 N.E. 407 (1927) ; City of Indian-
apolis v. Nagg, 57 Ind. App. 493, 107 N.E. 529 (1915) ; Southern Ry. Co. v. Town of
French Lick, 52 Ind. App. 302, 7 N.E.2d 534 (1913).
32. Decker v. Evansville Suburban & N. Ry., 133 Ind. 493, 33 N.E. 349 (1893).
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-903 (Burns 1953). The last two sentences provide for
payment of damages to an injured party.
34. Oler v. Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry., 184 Ind. 431, 111 N.E. 619 (1916).
35. Southern Ry. Co. v. Town of French Lick, 52 Ind. App. 447, 100 N.E. 762
(1913).
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street to be vacated, and it is apparent that no such limitation can
reasonably be made. Persons owning property abutting on the
street may be, and in many instances are, particularly interested
and affected by the vacation of a portion of the street other than
that part upon which their property abuts. but persons who
have sufficient or specially suited means of ingress and egress
as alleged in appellant's petition do not have more than a general
interest common to the citizens of the particular vicinity, city or
town."8
There is no clear indication of what an Indiana court would do if it
were required to decide what constitutes a particular interest in land
dedicated for a purpose other than a street or an alley, but it should be
noted that no objection was raised in the intervention of the non-abutting
lot-owners in the Reeves case.3" In a Texas case 3 a complaint against a
city was upheld for diverting the use of a park which was dedicated in a
conveyance to the plaintiff. The court said that as an abutting property
owner who took with reference to the dedication, the plaintiff had experi-
enced a special injury. The court established the measure of damages as
the difference between the fair market value of the lot before the diversion
and the fair market value of the lot after the diversion. Since the court
found that recovery was dependent upon the showing of a special injury,
the case lends support to the conclusion that a particular interest in public
ground should be the same as a particular interest in a street or an alley-
one to which the destruction of the dedication causes a special or peculiar
injury.
To determine the persons who must be named in a petition to vacate,
it is necessary first to determine what parties have an interest and then
to test each of these interests with reference to the kind of injury they
would suffer in a vacation to see if they are particular interests. It seems
clear that five different parties have some interest in a dedicated tract-
the dedicator/grantor (the subdivision developer), grantees whose prop-
erty abuts the dedicated tract, other grantees who took non-abutting lots
with reference to the plat, the public in general and the city or county
authorities who must act for the public's interest.
36. Id. at 455, 100 N.E. at 764.
37. State v. Reeves, 237 Ind. 240, 144 N.E.2d 707 (1957). The question could
have been raised here as to whether or not the non-abutting lot owners could validly
object to a vacation of the park area, i.e., did they have a "particular interest." The
fact that it was not raised lands support to the argument that apparently the parties
involved in the litigation did not seriously doubt the presence of a "particular interest"
in the "non-abutters."
38. State v. Clark, 336 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. 1960).
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The Interest of the Dedicator/Grantor. Under Indiana law the
dedicator only gives an interest to the public in the nature of an easement,
retaining the fee simple title to the land, subject to the easement of public
use for which the dedication was made.3" This condition of the title exists
regardless of how the dedication was made-common law, statutory or by
conveyance-and regardless of the size of the tract dedicated.4" This
interest is thus described in Decker v. Evaniville & N. Ry. Co.:
When the owner of land lays out a town upon the same, platting
it into lots, streets, and alleys, and causing such plat to be record-
ed, under the provisions of our statute upon the subject, he
conveys to the public a mere easement in the streets and alleys
retaining in himself the fee simple of the land over which such
streets and alleys pass. 1
Therefore, before any conveyance is made by the dedicator, it is clear
thfat a vacation of a dedicated tract would result in placing the fee simple
title, free of the restrictive easement, in the dedicator, and this is true
whether the dedicated land be street, alley or public ground. The question
remains as to the effect on the dedicator's interest of conveying lots
with reference to the plat. This effect may only be determined by exam-
ining first the abutting grantee's interest and then the non-abutting
grantee's interest.
The Interest of the Abutting Grantee. A grantee who takes a lot
which abuts a dedicated street or alley takes the dedicator/grantor's
interest of a fee simple to the center of the dedicated tract, subject to the
easement in the public;42 more accurately stated, the grantee takes what
interest the dedicator/grantor had.43 As an Indiana case stated, "So
when he [the dedicator] conveys to a purchaser a lot abutting upon such
street, the fee simple to the center of the street upon which the lot abuts
passes by such conveyance to the purchaser, as a part and parcel of the lot
-so conveyed." 44 To demonstrate the conclusion that the grantee takes
39. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N.E. 942 (1896) ; Decker v.
Evansville Suburban & N. Ry., 133 Ind. 493, 33 N.E. 349 (1893); Brackney v. Boyd,
71 Ind. App. 592, 123 N.E. 695 (1919).
40. Ibid.
41. Decker v. Evansville Suburban & N. Ry., 133 Ind. 493, 494, 33 N.E. 349, 350
(1893) (dictum).
42. Brackney v. Boyd, 71 Ind. App. 592, 123 N.E. 695 (1919).
43. Brackney v. Boyd, 71 Ind. App. 592, 123 N.E. 695, rehearing denied, 71 Ind.
App. 600, 125 N.E. 238 (1919), which said, ". . . [W]hen streets are vacated the fee
thereof to the center of the street continues in the owner of the abutting land; in other
words, it goes back to the grantee, immediate or remote, of the owner who dedicated
it to public use."
44. Decker v. Evansville Suburban & N. Ry., 133 Ind. 493, 494, 33 N.E. 349, 350
(1893).
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exactly the interest that the dedicator/grantor held, the court in another
case stated:
[W]here the street or highway has been wholly made from, and
upon the margin of, the grantor's land the subsequent grant of
adjoining land should be deemed to comprehend the fee in the
whole of the street so dedicated.45
Now the question remains regarding how much of the dedi-
cator/grantor's interest, if any, is received by the grantee who purchases
a lot which abuts a dedicated tract that is not a street or an alley, such as a
school yard. Generally, when a dedicator gratuitously dedicates a large
tract of land to a public purpose, he retains something similar to a
possibility of reverter which does not pass from him simply because he
sells some adjoining land.4" The reasoning is probably that he occupies
the same position in the eyes of the court as a person who conveys a
determinable fee to a public authority to last so long as the land is used
for a certain public purpose, such as a park or a school. When the con-
ditions of the determinable fee are violated, the court will generally
restore the land to him in fee simple." The absence of consideration
probably explains the favored treatment that the courts give the gratuitous
conveyancer. However, when a valuable consideration is received, it is
clear that the court does not give the conveyancer such protection, but
rather, closely construes the conditions in the deed to prevent a forfeiture
of the estate.4"
In the case of the subdivision developer who dedicates land by mark-
ing and recording a plat, it would seem that he should not occupy the
favored position that a gratuitous dedicator enjoys. He differs from the
gratuitous dedicator in that he is a business man and experiences no
economic loss because of the dedication. Dedication of land within the
plat increases the value of the remaining land. When lots are sold, the
dedicator is reimbursed for the cost of the dedicated land. Therefore, to
allow the subdivision developer to retain an interest similar to a possibility
of reverter would be to give him a potential windfall at the expense of
45. Brackney v. Boyd, 71 Ind. App. 592, 123 N.E. 695, rehearing denied, 71 Ind.
App. 600, 125 N.E. 238 (1919).
46. This interest is described as one similar to a possibility of reverter since a
diversion of the use extinguishes the easement, just as a violation of the conditions
terminates the existence of a determinable fee. Jose v. Hunter, 60 Ind. App. 569, 103
N.E. 392 (1913).
47. Carter v. School Township of Liberty, 70 Ind. App. 604, 123 N.E. 645 (1919);
Fall Creek Township v. Shuman, 55 Ind. App. 232, 103 N.E. 677 (1913).
48. Briggs v. City of Grand Rapids, 261 Mich. 11, 245 N.W. 555 (1932) ; Board
of Education v. Brophy, 90 N.J. Eq. 57, 106 Atl. 32 (1919) ; Miller v. Village of Brook-
ville, 152 Ohio St 217, 89 N.E2d 85 (1949).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the individual lot owners who purchased from him. It would seem that
reason and justice require that when the dedicator/grantor sells lots
with reference to the plat containing dedicated land which constitutes
"public ground," his interest in the dedicated land is conveyed in the
same manner as it is when he sells lots that abut streets or alleys. The
dedication was made to benefit the land within the plat, and the individual
lot owners paid for the benefits.49
The Interest of the Non-Abutting Grantee. The grantees of the
dedicator/grantor who purchased lots not abutting or adjoining the
dedicated tract originally had some enforceable interest in keeping the
dedicated streets and alleys open as a result of their taking with refer-
ence to a plat. However, the value of this interest has progressively
lessened because it must qualify as a particular interest to be enforceable.
Prior to the enactment of the vacation statutes, the interest in dedicated
land acquired by taking with reference to a plat was recognizable and
enforceable. In 1855, the Indiana Supreme Court expressed the presence
of the interest as follows:
The laying out of this addition, recording the plat, and selling
lots with reference to the adjoining streets and alleys, gave to the
proprietors of these lots a private right, distinct from the claim
of the public, which even the legislature could not take away,
unless to appropriate to a public use.5"
Then in 1901, the court found a special injury, but went further and said:
The right of the public is not involved in this litigation. As
between appellee and the persons from whom she purchased,
and those in privity with her, as appellant is, she is entitled to
have all the streets on the plat by which she purchased kept open
as streets.5
Since the passage of the vacation statutes, three cases have occurred
in appellate courts of Indiana which illustrate the present attitude toward
the private right. In 1915 a court refused to issue an injunction sought
against a board of public works for proceeding in the vacation of a
49. No reported case was found concerning this problem. However, it may appear
soon, since there are cases beginning now where the dedicator (or his heir or assigns)
is arguing that certain land designated within a plat did not constitute a dedication,
e.g., "park." If they lose on this argument, they may pursue the vacation and claim
the reversion of the fee.
50. Common Council of Indianapolis v. Craas, 7 Ind. 8, 12 (1855).
51. Strunk v. Pritchett, 27 Ind. App. 582, 61 N.E. 973 (1901), where the court
upheld an order enjoining the appellant from closing an alley dedicated via a plat which
the appellee had purchased with reference to, and which closing would have destroyed
the normal way to the rear of her property.
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street because no special injury had been shown and said that the fact
that petitioner had purchased with reference to a plat was immaterial."
In 1927 the court held"3 that remonstrances to a proceeding to vacate a
street were filed too late to be effective, but went further and said in a
dictum that even if the remonstrance had been filed in time, the result
would be the same since the plat showed that the objectors were not
owners of lots adjoining the dedicated land and therefore incurred no
special injury. Then in a 1949 case in which the appellant contended that
a board of public works could not take away his private right in a street
by a vacation proceeding under section 48-2001," * the court held"5 that
the private right could be extinguished because the statute provided for
compensation. 5 Therefore, with reference to streets and alleys, the non-
abutting or non-adjoining grantee does not hold a particular interest
because of his purchase with reference to the plat and may object to a
vacation only if he shows special or peculiar injury, the existence of
which is difficult to imagine.
The fact that the non-abutting grantee can show no special injury
when a street or alley is vacated need not mean that he experiences no
special injury when a tract dedicated for a park or school purposes is
vacated. There is an important distinction between the damage done to
the non-abutting grantee when a street, alley or a portion thereof is
vacated and when a tract dedicated for a park or school area is vacated.
He can show no special injury in the vacation of a street or an alley
because he still has sufficient means of ingress and egress to his property.
He occupies the same position as the public in general in that there is one
less right-of-way on which to travel. However, the vacation of a tract
dedicated for school purposes or for park purposes may result in an
injury different in kind to the non-abutting grantee than to the public
in general, because it may be more injurious than the mere reduction by
one in the number of parks, schools or school playgrounds which serve the
entire community. The value of a park or school to a particular land
owner is normally determined by the proximity of the park or school to
his lot, i.e., the convenience of access to the dedicated tract. Therefore,
the vacation of a park area may result in a total loss of neighborhood park
area for the non-abutting grantee, and the vacation of land dedicated for
52. City of Indianapolis v. Magg, 57 Ind. App. 493, 107 N.E. 529 (1915).
53. Petition of Dearmin, 86 Ind. App. 349, 156 N.E. 407 (1927).
54. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-2001 (Burns 1953).
55. Skinner v. Pittman Moore Co., 119 Ind. App. 458, 85 N.E.2d 279 (1949).
56. Compare Oler v. Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry., 184 Ind. 431, 111 N.E. 619
(1916) in which the party seeking to show a private right was an owner of abutting
property. The case is discussed in the text accompanying note 34 supra.
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school purposes may result in the non-abutting grantee's children attend-
ing a school located at a much greater distance from home. This distinc-
tion should make a showing of a special injury or the presence of a
particular interest in the non-abutting grantee with reference to "public
ground." Of course, the existence of the special injury should be a
question of fact 7 as to each non-abutting grantee to determine if the
vacation actually causes him a special or peculiar injury. The conclusion
is that even though the non-abutting grantee does not have to be named
as a party with a particular interest when a street or alley is vacated,
he should be named when the tract sought to be vacated is one consisting
of "public ground" in the nature of a park or a school area.
The Interest of the Public in General. Since the dedicator gives an
easement to the public to use the property for the purpose for which it
was dedicated, it follows that the public in general has an interest in the
right to use the easement. By the very nature of an easement for public
use, it is difficult to imagine a case in which it would not be an exclusive
easement, since any private use or diversion of the land would result in
an obstruction of the public easement. Of course, the public's interest
cannot be a particular interest which would require special mention in
a petition to vacate, because the particular interest, by definition, is an
interest contrasted with that of the public at large.
The Interest of the Public Authorities. The court has recognized a
particular interest in the city that requires naming it separately in a
petition to vacate a street or an alley within a city." This recognition is
a result of a 1927 amendment" to the notice statute which requires
naming the city as an adversary party to a vacation proceeding. In con-
struing this section of the act the Indiana Supreme Court said:
It is a matter of judicial knowledge that a city has an interest
and a responsibility with respect to the public streets and alleys
which are different than those of the public generally or of the
property owners adjacent to such streets and alleys. An ex-
amination of the 1927 amendment persuades one that the legis-
lature intended to place a municipality in a position to defend
such proceedings in a manner different from that of general
objectors.6"
57. The location of his lot within the plat may make him near another school or
park not located within the plat, but located conveniently close to him. This of course
would eliminate his special injury and reduce it to one common to the community in
general.
58. Gaston v. City of Shelbyville, 234 Ind. 512, 129 N.E.2d 793 (1955).
59. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-909 (Burns 1953).
60. Gaston v. City of Shelbyville, 234 Ind. 512, 516, 129 N.E.2d 793, 794 (1955).
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The court then upheld a decision denying a petition for vacating when
the city filed no remonstrances but simply filed a general denial, leaving
the petitioner with the burden of proof which he failed to sustain.
It would seem that the privilege conferred on the city by the statute
should be extended to cover "public ground," and further extended to
apply to the county commissioners to provide the utmost protection to
the public for the retention of dedicated land. However, the statute is
now only applicable for notification of the city in the limited case of
seeking a vacation of a street or an alley located within the corporate
limits.
CONCLUSION
One principal thought must be kept in mind when dealing with
statutory dedication and statutory vacation. The act of dedication creates
only an easement for the public use, so vacating the dedication may only
result in extinguishment of the easement. For this reason the fee simple
ownership of the land must always be susceptible of determination. With
regard to streets and alleys, there is sufficient authority to determine that
originally the fee in the dedicated right-of-way is in the dedicator/grantor,
but when he conveys to an abutting grantee, this interest passes from him
to the abutting grantee. In addition, the abutting grantee has a particular
interest in the dedicated land since vacation of the tract materially affects
his right of ingress and egress to his property. The non-abutting grantee
has no enforceable interest in a dedicated street or alley. Since the
abutting grantee takes the fee to the dedicated street, the non-abutter can
claim no right there. The purchase of the lot with reference to the plat
is immaterial in creating a private right, so the non-abutter has no interest
there. The location of his lot in relation to the dedicated street forbids
his showing a material effect on his ingress and egress to his lot, so no
special injury can be made out in order to qualify him as a person
particularly interested.
In the area of public ground the authority is sparse, but there is no
reason that forbids the dedicator/grantor's sale of lots also causing a
passing of his interest in the public ground.6 ' The abutting grantees
On this point City of Indianapolis v. Magg, 57 Ind. App. 493, 107 N.E. 529 (1915)
said that an action should be brought by the proper city official on behalf of the public
where there has been an invasion of the common rights of the municipality.
61. In the Reeves case no thought was given to the possibility that a vacation of
the large tract, i.e., the lake, beach and park area, would result in the original dedicator
owning the land free of the restrictive easement. The petition to vacate by the "abutters"
in order to exclude other persons from using the tract and the objection 'by the "non-
abutters" to protect their right to use the tract show clearly that the parties to the action
assumed that he "abutters" owned the fee to the land. However, the case cannot
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should take legal title to the dedicated land plus a proportionate beneficial
interest, and the non-abutting grantees should be deemed to hold a bene-
ficial interest in the dedicated land. The abutting lot owners should be
charged with the responsibility of holding the fee, subject to the easement
for the dedicated purpose, for the benefit of all grantees within the plat
who would experience a peculiar or special injury if the dedicated land
were vacated. Advocating that the title be split in this manner is only
to suggest that public ground should be in the same position, regarding
the ownership and interests therein, in a subdivision located without the
city limits as the old "commons" or "common ground" in early com-
munities. Like the proprietor of the "commons," i.e., the abutting land
owner, who held title to the "common ground" for the benefit of the
community, the abutter of the dedicated tract should hold for the benefit
of the community of persons within the plat.62 This condition of the
title eliminates the possibility of any person-dedicator or abutting
grantee-reaping the harvest of a windfall after a vacation of public
ground and also allows for alienability of the land, since the legal fee
simple is vested in a relatively small number of people.63
Since it is necessary, at times, for the public authority to hold the
fee to dedicated land to effect the dedicated purpose, it is necessary to
determine a proper, safe manner in which to achieve such a result. As
vacating under section 48-903 only extinguishes the easement and in no
way can effect an actual conveyance of the fee to the public authority,
it should not be the initial step. If the dedication is vacated before the
fee is acquired by the public authority, the vacation would destroy the
public authority's interest. The first step is to obtain a deed to the
dedicated land from the abutting property owners. In addition a deed
to the dedicated land should be obtained from the original dedi-
cator/grantor, his heirs or assigns. 4 This step protects against the pos-
establish that the parties believed vacation could result in the "abutters" excluding the
"non-abutters" from using the tract. The intervening lot owners only sought a writ of
prohibition which raised the jurisdictional question of a circuit court's power to vacate
"public ground." The question of who the "abutters" could exclude was never decided
because a compromise agreement provided that all non-abutting property owners retain
a private easement in the tract. Then the subsequent vacation proceeded smoothly with
the result that the area is now used by all lot owners within the plat, the public
being excluded.
62. Proprietors of Jeffries Neck Pasture v. Inhabitants of Ipsmich, 153 Mass. 42,
26 N.E. 239 (1891).
63. This conclusion creates an additional problem which is beyond the scope of this
note but is of necessary practical consideration, i.e., how to describe the interest of the
grantees in the dedicated land in regard to the physical limitations.
64. If any party refuses to convey, his interest could be obtained through the power
of eminent domain. Prior to vacation the value of their interest is nominal since at that
time it is unlikely that the encumbrance created by dedication will ever be removed.
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sibility of a court holding that a subdivision developer does not sell his
interest in large dedicated tracts by conveying lots with reference to the
plat. After securing these deeds, the public authority could petition
under section 48-903 to vacate the dedication. The public authority
would not be faced with the problem of naming the "persons particularly
interested therein" because they would hold all those "particular interests."
Then vacation would leave the public authority the owner of the land
in fee with the restrictive easement destroyed.
